Researchers studying both cellular and viral disease agents in the laboratory have become infected since the early days of microbiology 150 years ago. However, in the early 21st century, new concerns about bioweapons being used to generate terror and also with a series of newly emerging or newly understood disease-causing microbes have resulted in infections and deaths of workers studying these microbes in the laboratory, generally to gain understanding and to develop treatments and vaccines. Here, five examples are summarized: (i) smallpox virus escaped from a UK laboratory where it was being maintained and stored, (ii) the 2014 infections and deaths of five researchers who were isolating West African Ebola virus for DNA sequencing epidemiology studies, (iii) and (iv) two recent infections that happened in the same US laboratory where researchers were infected with agents causing septicemic Yersinia plague and Bacillus anthrax and (v) the 2012 death in California from laboratory infection by Neisseria meningitidis resulting in spinal meningitis.
SMALLPOX INFECTION IN BIRMINGHAM UK 1978
The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the world smallpox-free in 1980. Smallpox was the first disease completely eliminated by vaccination and control (Fenner 1993) . Nevertheless, virulent smallpox virus is maintained in two government centers, at the Communicable Disease Center (CDC) in Atlanta Georgia, USA and at Koltsobo, near Novosibirsk in Siberia Russia (Breman et al., 2003; Arita and Francis 2014) , and perhaps also in a small number of unrecorded locations. The Siberian site for smallpox storage is at the Vector Center, which remains a major research center focusing on molecular biology, virology, genetic engineering, biotechnology and epidemiology of other viruses as well. This former bioweapons production facility was the site of a 2004 death of a researcher from an Ebola virus needle stick (Miller 2004; Stone 2004) . The Russian scientist, Antonina Presnyakova, was working on an Ebola vaccine, apparently with unofficial support from an American private company (Miller 2004; Stone 2004 ). In addition, Günther et al. (2011) reported another Ebola needle stick accident in 2009 in a high containment BSL4 facility in Hamburg, Germany. The patient was treated by vaccination with a live attenuated virus vaccine against recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus that expressed the Ebola glycoprotein (Günther et al., 2011) . The points to be repeated here include that there is no clear separation between storage and research facilities (Guillemin 2005) or between research and treatment facilities. Accidents will happen.
There is a continuing debate as to whether such potentially lethal viruses as smallpox and Ebola should be stored in authorized locations or destroyed (Arita and Francis 2014) . In general, researchers wish for remaining smallpox samples to be destroyed and it is government representatives who support retaining them. The potential always remains that natural accidents including floods and earthquakes, human negligence or even deliberate release of such viruses by deranged individuals can result in infections. Another problem is that of smallpox samples stored without recognition at laboratory locations where the virus was studied up to 50 years ago. For example, sealed vials with freeze-dried smallpox virus were found in July 2014 in a storage room at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda MD USA that 42 years earlier had been turned over to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Dennis and Sun 2014) . The glass-sealed vials appeared intact and the vials were transferred to the high-security CDC facility in Atlanta for study before destruction. If stored samples of smallpox virus can be found today at the NIH main campus, then it seems almost certain that similar samples exist in smaller facilities in many countries. There is no effective way to determine how many or where. Focusing on authorized stored smallpox samples in Atlanta USA and Koltsobo Russia does not address the global problem.
In August 1978, Janet Parker was the last person to die of smallpox (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janet Parker), and this was from virus escape in a highly regarded research laboratory at the Birmingham University Medical School in the UK (Shooter 1980) . Parker was probably infected on the 24 or 25 July 1978 and became ill only on 11 August 1978. She died on 11 September 1978. She was never known to be in the smallpox laboratory, but worked in the Anatomy Department, one floor directly above the smallpox laboratory, as a medical photographer (Shooter 1980) . Parker was on record as having been vaccinated for smallpox 12 years earlier. The conclusion was reached that the virus probably had travelled in air currents up a service air duct from the virus laboratory to the room where Parker frequently used the Anatomy Department telephone. The cause of Parker's death from laboratory-acquired smallpox virus is accepted (Shooter 1980) , although there remains some question as to how the virus moved from floor to floor in the building. There were post-death calculations that an unreasonably high number of smallpox particles would need to have been released by aerosol to result in her infection. An alternative hypothesis was that the virus was carried by ants that moved from room to room along electric wiring tracts.
As sometimes occurs with laboratory-acquired lethal infections, the viral cause of the illness symptoms was not recognized quickly. Serious symptoms developed more than 2 weeks after initial infection and the recognized pox spots did not appear for a full month. Then diagnosis followed quickly. This slow diagnosis allowed transmission of the disease to Parker's mother, Hilda Witcomb, who survived (Shooter 1980 
THE EBOLA EPIDEMIC OF 2014
In late 2014, it is not smallpox virus infection that is of global concern but rather the West African outbreak of Ebola, a completely different type of virus with a negative strand RNA and a relatively small 19 kb genome with seven structural genes. An August 2014 report in Science describes the DNA sequences from cDNA of 99 separate viral isolates from 78 patients (Gire et al., 2014) . As usual with RNA viruses, mutations had occurred even within the brief timescale and location from which the samples were obtained. These few differences in sequences are hoped to be useful both for molecular epidemiology and for drug development against Ebola (Vence 2014; Vogel 2014) . Gire et al. (2014;  with 48 authors) dedicated their report to five co-author researchers who died of Ebola after they became infected at a government hospital in Sierra Leone. As always, laboratory researchers handling direct clinical materials are more likely become infected than are researchers with no direct contact with patient samples.
Yersinia pestis INFECTION IN CHICAGO USA IN 2009
The University of Chicago laboratory in which Professor Malcolm Casadaban was infected carried out basic molecular pathogenesis research on Yersinia and other bioweapons level pathogens with the goal of developing useful treatments and vaccine proteins and strains. That does not sound inherently dangerous. This author knew Casadaban for most of his scientific life and spent a couple of hours with him in the open BSL2 Yersinia lab a few months before his death. We sat at the lab bench with another senior researcher, discussing and planning future experiments. When Casadaban felt seriously ill a week before his death, neither Casadaban nor Professor Olaf Schneewind, the head of the Yersinia group at the University whom he notified of his illness by e-mail, raised the possibility of Yersinia bacteria being the causal agent of his flu-like illness. The illness was sufficient to have taken him away from laboratory work and to the university health clinic days earlier. If either had recognized the possibility, then aggressive antibiotic treatment might have prevented his death. This is difficult to understand.
After Casadaban died, the university administration pulled together avoiding suggestions as to the cause of what had happened for as long as possible. In a University of Chicago chapel memorial 3 days after his death, the head of the Yersinia research group held Casadaban's laboratory notebook in his hand while praising him-but then strangely (to me, sitting there) said nothing about the already identified manner of death. Reports were later released with statements that Casadaban was possibly responsible for his infection by sloppy dangerous behavior (CDCP 2011; Chou 2014) . Blaming the victim seems unfair. Casadaban was sometimes relaxed, as are others with microbiological knowledge and understanding, but often he seemed excessively stringent. In a memorial in J. Bacteriol., it was twice stated that Casadaban had 'passed away' but without mention that it was from bacterial septicemia (Beckwith et al., 2010) . Efforts to protect the university by obfuscation (Kaiser 2011; Randall 2011) are probably standard now with all university administrations. It was, however, basically as Chou (2014) describes.
The complete DNA genome sequences of the chloramphenicol-resistant variant of the attenuated laboratory Y. pestis strain KIM and of the Yersinia isolated from Casadaban were determined. They were identical (CDCP 2011; Frank, Schneewind and Shieh 2011; Quenee et al., 2012) . The chloramphenicol-resistance gene cassette in the variant strain had actually been added by Casadaban (Chou 2014, p. 161) .
Although most laboratory-acquired infections happen to younger scientists, Casadaban was a 60-year-old Associate Professor of Molecular Microbiology at the University of Chicago. He had participated in the Yersinia research group for several years, but there are no co-authored published reports including his efforts. Casadaban is better known from his early work on useful lac gene fusions (Casadaban 1975; Casadaban, Chou and Cohen 1980) as well on the mechanism of DNA transposition ( Chou et al., 1979a,b) , much done together with Joany Chou. Chou (2014) usefully 'screen captured' and pasted brief pages of many primary sources on Casadaban's death in her recent book. This information is otherwise not readily available and the lack of information certainly is a problem understanding the other laboratory-acquired infections described here.
The attenuated Y. pestis strain KIM was originally isolated at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick MD, the site also of the 2001 anthrax bacterial spores. The strain was later transferred to Michigan State University by Brubaker (1969) , a researcher who had worked on Yersinia at Fort Detrick. Y. pestis strain KIM is a spontaneously attenuated strain that was initially identified as pgm (lacking pigments) and has a 102 kb deletion including an approximately 30 kb high-pathogenicity island containing genes associated with iron uptake by the cells (Fetherston, Schuetze and Perry 1992; Buchrieser et al., 1999) . The deletion removes the genes for biosynthesis of yersiniabactin (a salicylate/thiazol siderophore that is found in most Yersinia strains (not only Y. pestis) and some pathogenic E. coli as well (Perry et al., 1999 ). Casadaban's death is reported to be the first in approximately 50 years laboratory work with this attenuated strain (Frank, Schneewind and Shieh 2011) .
After his death, it was determined that Casadaban had previously unrecognized high blood iron levels (CDCP 2011; Quenee et al., 2012) . Casadaban had a C282Y mutation in the HFE iron regulatory gene and high serum and liver Fe levels indicative of hereditary hemochromatosis (Frank, Schneewind and Shieh 2011) . Apparently, Casadaban was unaware of high blood iron levels, although this might have become apparent during standard medical checkups. Quenee et al. (2012) studied death of mice with hereditary hemochromatosis from bubonic and pneumonic plague on infection by the same strain that was responsible for Casadaban's death. Mouse blood Fe levels were 50% higher in the Hjv −/− (hemojuvelin) animals than with wild-type mice. Hjv −/− mice infected either subcutaneously or via nasal passage were killed by the attenuated laboratory strain (Quenee et al., 2012) . However, it required about 5 × 10 8 colony-forming units of the attenuated laboratory strain to kill the high-iron mice, while 500 colony-forming units of a virulent wild-type Y. pestis strain killed both low-iron and high-iron mice (Quenee et al., 2012) . Perhaps in the future laboratory, researchers studying attenuated Y. pestis strains will have regular measurements of blood iron. There is another worrisome question about Casadaban's death from septicemic Yersinia infection, similar to that of how Parker became infected with smallpox virus (above). How did the laboratory bacteria get into his body? Unlike historic bubonic plague of the lymph nodes that is transmitted often by flea bites and pneumonic plague transmitted by inhaling airborne bacteria (Girard 1955) , the alternative possibilities here for septicemic plague were through a small unrecognized cut in his skin or by oral ingestion. The autopsy evidence was unclear (CDCP 2011; Chou 2014), however, not finding skin wounds, not even reporting needle marks for insulin injections whereas Casadaban was known to be an insulin-dependent diabetic. However, important information was apparently not provided to the University of Chicago Medical Center division that carried out the initial autopsy 2 days after Casadaban's death (Chou 2014, p. 169-, p. 273-) . That the Gram-negative rod-shaped bacteria found quickly in his blood culture might be laboratory-origin Yersinia was not initially suggested. It seems difficult to understand how the equivalent of 1 ml of a bacterial culture (as needed to kill the high-iron mice by the attenuated Yersinia) could have entered Casadaban through the skin. Entrance of a small number of bacteria through an unrecognized skin site seems a more reasonable guess for the mode of infection. Chou (2014, p. 158) argues improbably that oral ingestion of a large number of the laboratory strain bacteria as a live vaccine was the mode of infection, based on published protocols from the same laboratory and planned tests of vaccination by ingestion of a different Yersinia species. However, this microbiologist cannot see how one can conclude that Casadaban was an intended volunteer or that the mouse protocol was ever put in to use with humans. If that had been the case, there surely would have been a record of his activities in Casadaban's home and the strain would have been the original attenuated Y. pestis strain KIM and not the chloramphenicol-resistant derivative of that strain developed by the University of Chicago laboratory. The University of Chicago sought to avoid responsibility by blaming the victim, Casadaban, reporting that he was sloppy about laboratory coats and rubber gloves (Chou 2014) .
Bacillus cereus ANTHRAX IN CHICAGO IN 2011
Severe or fatal respiratory diseases with symptoms indistinguishable from anthrax that is caused by Bacillus cereus strains with Bacillus anthracis pXO1-like virulence plasmids have been reported, mostly in the southwest United States. B. cereus and B. anthracis are closely related and belong to the same species, Bacillus cereus sensu lato. B. anthracis sensu strictu is a subgroup of this species (Silver 2013; Van der Auwera et al., 2013) . For many microbiologists accustomed to species and genus names, which over time often can be 'split' with one species dividing into several or be 'lumped' with several species joined into one, the idea of species 'sensu lato' and 'sensu stricto' is novel or arbitrary. We function as 'If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck' (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duck test). B. anthracis is unique among the B. cereus biovars in its ability to cause anthrax in both humans and in other animals.
Soon after the 2009 death from laboratory-acquired Y. pestis septicemia, the University of Chicago spent over $600K USD in cleaning laboratory facilities and replacing supplies and laboratory equipment. However, the same laboratory continued working with rather relaxed conditions (if you want to call them that) until they experienced a frightening anthrax infection 2 years later, in 2011. A researcher in the same laboratory room came down with laboratory-acquired anthrax-like disease (Kaiser 2011) . The cause of the cutaneous localized infection was quickly recognized and the unnamed researcher responded to appropriate surgery and antibiotics. She survived.
The University of Chicago anthrax group concluded after sequencing the bacterial genome from both the laboratory strain and the patient (as happened also to the 2009 Yersinia) that it looked like Bacillus anthracis, but that it really was a slightly different anthrax-causing Bacillus cereus strain number G9241 Wang et al., 2013) . Of course, Y. pestis (Gram-negative proteobacteria) and B. anthracis (Gram-positive low G+C spore former) are quite different bacteria, with the major common factor that they both kill humans rapidly and with high probability. Again responsibility (personal or laboratory) and the mode of infection (skin) were raised after this second highly improbable but maybe avoidable situation working in the same room on these dangerous bacteria that are not technically listed as 'select agents'. Further work was immediately moved in 2011 from the University of Chicago campus to a newly opened high-security facility at the Argonne National Laboratory grounds some 45 km away. Perhaps death from laboratoryacquired plague bacillus helped save the life of this second person, as it was the rapid recognition of the problem and then intensive treatment that occurred.
OTHER LABORATORY ORIGIN ANTHRAX INFECTIONS
Although the 2011 Chicago anthrax infection was the most recent laboratory-researcher infection by anthrax-producing bacteria, there were two earlier and larger clusters of infections, one each associated with government laboratories in the USA and in Russia, where B. anthracis spores were produced and tested. The most familiar one was the American 2001 bioterrorism scare when B. anthracis spores were sent through the mail to multiple recipients (Rasko et al., 2011) . The spores themselves originated at the Fort Detrick Maryland US government research laboratory where Yersinia research has also been carried out (see above). As a result of the posting of anthrax spores by a deranged person (and not research-related) who mailed letters containing anthrax spores in the US post, 22 people were infected, 11 with cutaneous anthrax (Jernigen et al. 2001) and 11 with inhalation anthrax (Johnson 2005) . Five of the inhalation-infected people died (Jernigan et al., 2001; Johnson 2005 ). An additional cutaneous infection of a laboratory worker who handled the original materials occurred the next year (Johnson 2005) .
Based largely on the bacterial genome sequence (Rasko et al., 2011) and the physical properties of the recovered anthrax spores, it was concluded that Bruce E. Ivins was responsible for mailing the anthrax spores (Guillemin 2011) . Ivins worked directly with anthrax spores at the so-called 'biodefense research unit' at Fort Detrick. He published reports on anthrax in the open literature (e.g. Vietri et al., 2006) and participated actively in the post-2001 government investigation as to the source of the anthrax spores that had been mailed. Eventually, it was concluded that the content of his 'research flask' of anthrax spores (part of a project to develop anthrax vaccines) was genomically the same as those recovered from patients who had died. However, this issue was never officially resolved when Ivins committed suicide in 2008 (7 years after the 2001 attack), just prior to his expected arrest for mailing the lethal anthrax spores (Guillemin 2011) . On the death of Ivins, the criminal investigation was closed (http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Bruce Edwards Ivins#cite note-NASreport-15). A few years earlier a different person working at Fort Detrick had been considered to be possibly responsible, but he was eventually cleared. Serious unproven doubts were later expressed also as to whether Ivins could have carried out the anthrax attack alone but this issue also was never resolved (Guillemin 2011) .
The origin of the 2001 anthrax spores from a US Army research facility emphasizes-again-the impossibility of separating offensive from defensive research facilities and research facilities from those involved in the production of bioweapons (Guillemin 2005) and clinical care of patients. The American cartoonist Walt Kelly wrote in 1956 'We have met the enemy and he is us' (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pogo %28 comic strip%29#.22We have met the enemy and he is us.22).
The cost for the 2001-2002 cleanup of US postal facilities and government offices was over $1billion USA (Johnson 2005) . Consideration of this 2001 crisis is appropriate here, as it makes clear the point that one cannot effectively separate scientific researchers from more applied government defensive or offensive work on B. anthracis (Guillemin 2005) . As the B. anthracis bacteria are available to the 'good guys' (seeking understanding of the disease process, treatments and vaccine development), the possibilities remain of access by the 'bad guys' (either rogue governments or deranged individuals) (Guillemin 2005) .).
The United States officially discontinued bioweapons research in 1970 (Johnson 2005) , but the Russians continued largescale production at Sverdlovsk Russia (formerly and now again called Yekaterinburg). An accidental aerial spore release occurred in 1979, resulting in over 100 deaths from among 250-450 individuals infected out of doors up to 4 km downwind from the release site (Meselson et al., 1994; Dixon et al., 1999; Guillemin , 2005 Meselson 1999 ). More exact numbers are not possible due to laboratory and government secrecy. The facility in Sverdlovsk prepared and dried large amounts of weaponsquality anthrax spores. The accident occurred as the result of accidental removal of an air filter that would normally collect anthrax spores. As a result, an aerosol of anthrax spores blew on to the street outside the military facility and blew downwind for a distance of 4 km. The missing filter was replaced days before the first victims became ill (Meselson et al., 1994; . Again, these two major releases have been addressed here because there is no sharp line between laboratory-acquired infections of researchers and infections originating from government laboratories (Guillemin 2005) .
LABORATORY-ACQUIRED Neisseria

MENINGITIS 2012 IN SAN FRANCISCO
Researcher Richard Din died from a meningococcal infection on 28 April 2012, and he probably acquired the Neisseria meningitidis serotype B strain responsible while working to develop a vaccine for this pathogenic bacterium at the Northern California Institute for Research and Education at the Veteran Affairs (VA) Medical Center in San Francisco, California, which is associated with the University of California San Francisco, UCSF (Richards 2012) . Within hours of leaving work on 27 April 2012, Din felt ill. He died in the hospital emergency ward only 18 hours after the first symptoms were experienced. The laboratory where the infection occurred was immediately closed.
There is no record available as to whether the genome of the bacteria isolated from Din was identical to that being studied in the laboratory. This is now current practice and showed for example that the 2014 Neisseria serotype B strain that killed a student at Drexel University in Philadelphia was identical in DNA sequence to those isolated from Princeton University students in New Jersey 75 km away, during a 2014 university outbreak that does not involve laboratory researchers (CDCP 2014a) .
N. meningitidis serotype B is a rare but serious source of oftenfatal infections in crowded university student housing. A different university outbreak of N. meningitidis serotype B strain infections at the University of California, Santa Barbara, involves a different substrain readily distinguished by genome sequence (CDCP 2014b). Still another university student death apparently from bacterial meningitis occurred at San Diego State University at the time of the final revision of this paper in October 2014. However, identification of the cause of disease in San Diego, which is several hours from Santa Barbara by road, is not yet available, not even in the newspapers.
The US government Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) in April 2013 determined that excessively casual laboratory practices probably led to the San Francisco infection of researcher Richard Din [http://www.nbcbayarea.com/ news/local/Feds-Sanction-San-Francisco-VA-After-ResearcherDies-of- Meningitis-192290591 .html]. However, there is an absence of subsequent published background studies as to how the laboratory infection might have occurred. This fatal infection occurred at a university-associated hospital complex rather than in a university campus building, again demonstrating the lack of clear lines between research facilities and clinical facilities handling dangerous pathogenic microbes. The Chief of Infectious Disease at the San Francisco VA Center is Professor Harry Lampiris, an HIV virus expert who is also a Professor of Medicine at UCSF. The principal investigator of the Neisseria lab is Gary A. Jarvis, who is also a Professor at UCSF.
N. meningitidis infections have also occurred in US clinical laboratories and these are about 50% fatal (Sejvar et al., 2005) . However, that of Richard Din was apparently the first such reported infection of a laboratory researcher.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Laboratory-acquired viral and bacterial infections in research facilities happen. Although less common than infections of clinical workers handling patient samples, infections of researchers with serious pathogens can lead to death. This is an increasing problem as governments of technically advanced nations have increased research on potential bioterrorism agents and as concerns have grown about development of such bioweapons by rogue nations and non-government groups (Guillemin 2005) . This brief report is not the first, but rather a selective update and hopefully accessible means for educating young researchers who frequently are unaware of both the history and the dangers associated with the microbes that they study.
